AI as the Subject of Right: An Analysis from an Arendtian Perspective
6th Social Robots with AI: Prospects, Risks, and Responsible Methods Robophilosophy, RP 2024, Hybrid, Aarhus, Danimarka, 19 - 23 Ağustos 2024, cilt.397, ss.666-670, (Tam Metin Bildiri)
- Yayın Türü: Bildiri / Tam Metin Bildiri
- Cilt numarası: 397
- Doi Numarası: 10.3233/faia241561
- Basıldığı Şehir: Hybrid, Aarhus
- Basıldığı Ülke: Danimarka
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.666-670
- Anahtar Kelimeler: Hannah arnedt, legal rights for AI, legal subjectivity for non-human entities, moral status of non-human entities, robot rights
- Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
Legal rights for autonomous systems have been debated since the term "robot" was introduced in Capek's R.U.R. Today, with technological and legal advancements, the discussion on AI's legal rights has moved beyond science fiction to academic and legislative arenas. While debates often focus on the sentience or consciousness of AI, legal subjectivity is not solely tied to these traits. For instance, despite being unconscious, newborns have legal rights, while sentient beings like chimps may not. Arendt argues that legal subjectivity results from a social contract that emerges when individuals come together based on trust and mutual equality. Therefore, it is crucial to admit non-human beings, including AI systems, into communities such as states or international organizations for them to have legal rights. The legal subjectivity of AI, like other non-human entities, depends on people including AI systems in their network of relationships. Without such acceptance, legal rights for AI will remain elusive, regardless of the consciousness of AI..