Reading Avicennian Ontology from the al-Fārābīan Perspective: Problems of Reference and Neglected Concepts in Averroes’ Criticisms İbn Sînâcı Ontolojiyi Fârâbîci Gözle Okumak: İbn Rüşd’ün Eleştirilerinde Referans Sorunları ve İhmal Edilen Kavramlar
Hitit Theology Journal, vol.24, no.1, pp.222-244, 2025 (ESCI, Scopus)
- Publication Type: Article / Article
- Volume: 24 Issue: 1
- Publication Date: 2025
- Doi Number: 10.14395/hid.1615353
- Journal Name: Hitit Theology Journal
- Journal Indexes: Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI), Scopus, Academic Search Premier
- Page Numbers: pp.222-244
- Keywords: al-Fārābī’s Concept of Mawjūd, Averroes’ Criticism of Avicenna, Being, Essence, Existence, Islamic Philosophy, Quiddity
- Open Archive Collection: AVESIS Open Access Collection
- Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University Affiliated: Yes
Abstract
Averroes (d. 595/1198), known as a staunch defender of Aristotelian thought, made important criticisms of Avicennan ontology in various works, arguing that Avicenna’s (d. 428/1037) views on the relation between quiddity and existence deviated from the Aristotelian line and weakened philosophical thought. In making these criticisms, Averroes generally neglected Avicenna’s corpus and often referred to al-Fārābī’s (d. 339/950) Kitāb al-Ḥurūf rather than Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In order to justify the ontological distinction between the Necessary Existence and contingent beings, Avicenna established to some extent a real distinction between quiddity and existence, and argued that existence in contingent beings is a concomitant (lāzim) of quiddity. Averroes, on the other hand, considered this approach as an erroneous interpretation of Aristotle’s explanations in Metaphysics Δ.7 and accused Avicenna of describing ‘existence’ (wujūd) as an accident that is added to (zā’ida ‘alā) quiddity outside the mind. However, when we look at Metaphysics Δ.7, we encounter a fourfold pattern of meaning for ‘being’ (to on): (i) being per se (kath’ auto); (ii) being per accidens (kata sumbebekos); (iii) being as truth (aletheia); (iv) being as actuality (energia) and potentiality (dunamis). Aristotle does not explain there whether existence is an accident attached to quiddity or not. In fact, Averroes, while criticizing Avicenna on this issue, often makes use of al-Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, even if he does not mention the name. Referring to the aforementioned work, Averroes reveals some misunderstandings arising from the translation of estin (‘is’), the third person singular of the Greek infinitive verb einai (to be), into Arabic with the word mawjūd by the translators, and argues that Avicenna’s error stems precisely from these misleading translations. The greatest problem with rendering the Greek copula estin with the Arabic word mawjūd is that mawjūd, due to being a derivative term in its the first imposition (al-waḍ‘ al-awwal), gives the impression that it carries an accident of wujūd within its content. To overcome this problem, some translators have preferred to use the word huwa as a copula (rābiṭ) instead of mawjūd. In Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, al-Fārābī draws attention to this misleading situation and states that the term ‘being’ was abstracted from its derivational meaning in the transition from ordinary language to philosophical language, and that it was called ‘the second imposition’ (al-waḍ‘ al-thānī). According to Averroes, Avicenna fell victim to these misleading translations despite al-Fārābī’s warnings in al-Ḥurūf, thus misinterpreting Aristotelian ontology and conceiving existence as an accident attached to quiddity in the external world. In this context, our study seeks to answer the following basic questions: What is the influence of al-Fārābī on Averroes’ criticisms of Avicenna? Does Avicenna see existence only as an accident attached to quiddity, or is Averroes’ criticism based on a misunderstanding? What is the relationship between Aristotle’s concept of ‘being’ in Metaphysics Δ.7 and Avicenna’s quiddity-existence distinction? The analysis within the framework of these questions requires us to reread Averroes’ criticisms in their context in the corpus of Aristotle, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna. Our study reveals that Averroes bases his criticisms of Avicenna’s ontology on al-Fārābī’s triple meaning of ‘being’ in al-Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Ḥurūf rather than the fourfold meaning of ‘being’ in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Δ.7. Accordingly, the triple meaning of the word ‘being’ is as follows: (i) being as divided into the categories (al-maqūlāt); (ii) being circumscribed by a certain quiddity (al-munḥāz bi-māhiyyah mā) outside the mind; and (iii) being as truth (al-ṣādiq). On the other hand, Avicenna, in al-Shifā’: al-Ilāhiyyāt I.5, speaks of two meanings of existence: (i) proper existence (al-wujūd al-khāṣṣ), which corresponds to quiddity (māhiyyah) and/or essential reality (ḥaqīqah), and (ii) affirmative existence (al-wujūd al-ithbātī), which pertains to the concomitant of quiddity. While some scholars argue that there is a close relationship between al-Fārābī’s concept of ‘being circumscribed by a certain quiddity’ and Avicenna’s ‘proper existence,’ others argue that there is a clear overlap between al-Fārābī’s concept of ‘being as truth’ and Avicenna’s ‘affirmative existence’ in terms of both intention and extension. In the Turkish literature, I have yet to come across a comparative study of al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes’ conceptions of existence. In the English literature, there are some studies that focus on this topic, but I have observed that these studies either ignore the al-Fārābī background by focusing on Averroes’ criticisms of Avicenna or do not give enough space to Averroes’ criticisms while analyzing al-Fārābī and Avicenna’s conceptions of existence. In this article, following a common line of argumentation from al-Fārābī to Averroes via Avicenna, I will try to show that Averroes' criticisms of Avicenna's ontology emerge from an al-Fārābīan background and re-establish some key concepts neglected in Averroes’ criticisms with reference to Avicenna.